The papergeneralizes the economic features about Internet platforms and analyzestheir competitive strategies with the method of insulating pricing.The analysis focuses onthe quantity expectations game of platformsand their price expectations game.The function ofnetwork externalities on the Internet platforms hasan obvious feature of two stages, sotheircompetitive strategieshave to be divided into two distinct phases. Before the critical mass stage, companies need to pursue a rapid increase of subscribers in order to survive. After the critical capacity, differentiation strategy can be implemented by platform companies which seek maximum profit by the action of network externalities.
Introduction
In the Internet era of big data, various Internet platforms stake to fierce competition, which leads to a problem about how the Internet platforms compete. Compared with the traditional competitive strategies, competitive strategy of Internet platforms hides the key factor to success. This article attempts to explain competitive strategy of Internet platforms from a perspective of the network economic, which provides theoretical support and practical guidance for competition on the Internet platforms. Internet platformsarethe product of network economic development, so they have a lot of different characteristics compared with traditional companies. First, Platforms have significant network externalities (Katzand Shapiro, 1985) , which are generally divided into membership and usage externalities (Rochet andTirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006) .In addition to the analysis of network effects of platforms (Economides, 1995) , moreLiteratures discuss pricing strategy of platformsfrom membership externalities (Armstrong, 2006) and usageexternalities (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) . Weyl (2010) analyzed optimal pricing of platforms under different target with the method of insulatingtariffs. A more realistic problem is how platforms to participate in the competition. So the paper 2 mainly analyzes the competitive strategies of Internet platformsthrough two-sided markets and game theory. The paper is structured as follows.Section1introduces the basic features and model assumptions of the Internet platforms. Section 2 constructs theoretical models of platforms competition, includes the dynamic model about users' scale expectations and price expectations. Section 3summarizes the full paper and makes some relevant suggestions
Theoretical Model
In order to analyze competitive strategiesof platforms more clearly, the paper gives some assumptions:
(1) This analysisfocus on two platforms ( i , j ). When an Internet platform makes decisions, the other platforms are considered as a whole by it, namely two platforms inthe market. Platforms have two sides, d side and s side. (2) Only considering cross externalities of platforms, without considering externalities in the same side of platforms. Because the role of network makes marginal cost providing services to users is closely to zero.
Dynamic Game Model of quantity expectations
First, weanalyze how bilateral platforms takeprice competition with the methods of insulating tariffs and Game of expectation about users'quantity or scale (as amended Cournot model). Internet platforms have cross network externalities. The price of one side by platform charged is based on the (expected) quantity of users on the other size. Therefore, the pricing function of competitive platforms is:
Where, de ij hn is competitors' market share of a platform, i h is adjustment factor which can be either positive or negative, but it is usually negative in the model about expected quantity. It means that price of platform charged and userscale of the other side is negatively correlated. Profit function of platforms can be transformed into: 
From the result, the users' scale of one side onthe platform is decided by marginal cost of providing theses service, target users' scale of competitors and cross network externalities. The price of one side on the platform is depended on cross network externalities, the expected share of competitors and marginalcost. Then we analyze the impact of each factor on the platform pricing using the method of control variables: (1)Marginal cost. Assume that cross network externalities coefficient and the expected scale of competitorsare constant, the price function is:
It means that theprice set byplatforms is a positive correlation withthe marginal cost of platforms' services. This is consistent with the law of economics that the higher cost of these services provided for each customer interaction, the higher price charged by platforms.
(2)Expected scale ofcompetitors' other users. Assume that cross network externalities coefficient andmarginal cost are constant, the price function is:
It means that theprice set by platforms is anegative correlation with the expected scale of users on the other side of other competing platforms. This is consistent with the law of economics that the moreexpected scale of users on the other side of other competing platforms, the lower price charged by platforms.
(3)Cross network externalities coefficient.Assume that the expected scale of competitors and marginal costare constant, the price function is: Corollary 1: In repeated games, the equilibrium prices for Internet platforms are: 
In thequantity games, the competing platforms can reach an equilibrium state, which each platform will pricing based on the coefficient of interactive value. In order to simplify the analysis, the interaction coefficient and costs of the same platform The price on the side set byplatforms depends on the interaction coefficient, marginal cost factor and the expected users' share of opponents. Partial derivative on the price factor, as follows: 
Dynamic Game Model of price expectations
The paperanalyzescompetitive behavior of Internet platformsfromthe angle of expected quantitygames strategy previously. However,it is difficult to observe user scale of competitors in reality when platforms makespecific decisions. So people concernmore about competitors' recent price strategy.Thenthe paperfurther analyzes competitive behavior of Internet platformsfrom the angle of expected price games strategy. According toadaptive expectations in economics (time nearly effects of business or personal decisions), weamend competitionmodel of platformswith joining the recent price adjustment factor. Assuming price adjustment factor of platforms is influenced by the price of competitors in the previous period. The pricingfunction of platforms is:
Profit function of platforms can be transformed into: 
In the game about expected price, the price ofone side set by platformsfor users is determinedby cross network externalities and expected adjustment of competitors' price. Final equilibrium results are : 
From these results, the users' scale of one side on the platform is decided by marginal cost c  , the price of a platform is a negative correlation with marginal cost of competitors; when 1 i c  , the price of a platform is a positive correlation with marginal cost of competitors. This means platforms have the character of critical capacity.
Conclusion
According to our analysis,Internet platformsare mainly based on the size of the network externalities to conduct game competition. There is a critical mass in the development and competition of platforms. Before the critical mass, the role of external effects of the platform is very small, so it pursues rapid expansion of the size of the users, which can survive and avoid the establishment of failure. After the critical mass, the role of external effects of the platform is larger, so it adopts difference competition based on the size and the expected external behavior of competitors, which is in order to maximize corporate profits. So Internet platforms need to compete based on the stage. First, before the critical mass, platforms can adopt a single product or services strategy in order to control costs, as much as possible to attract more customers. It uses cost minimization rather than differentiation strategy to pursuit of rapid growth in user scale. Second, after reaching critical mass, platforms can adopt a differentiation strategy based network externalities size. It can better meet customers' different demandby providing different products or services fordifferent customer groups, according tointeractive coefficient. Deficiency of the paper is mainly to study the game of platforms under deterministic conditions, without considering the uncertainty of the situation. It can be further researched at-risk situations by adding the probability of various events.
